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Summary
Security in fog computing is multi-faceted, and one particular challenge is establishing a secure
communication channel between fog nodes and end devices. This emphasizes the importance
of designing efficient and secret key distribution scheme to facilitate fog nodes and end devices
to establish secure communication channels. Existing secure key distribution schemes designed
for hierarchical networks may be deployable in fog computing, but they incur high computa-
tional and communication overheads and thus consume significant memory. In this paper, we
propose a novel hierarchical key pre-distribution scheme based on “Residual Design” for fog
networks. The proposed key distribution scheme is designed to minimize storage overhead and
memory consumption, while increasing network scalability. The scheme is also designed to be
secure against node capture attacks. We demonstrate that in an equal-size network, our scheme
achieves around 84% improvement in terms of node storage overhead, and around 96% improve-
ment in terms of network scalability. Our research paves the way for building an efficient key
management framework for secure communication within the hierarchical network of fog nodes
and end devices.
KEYWORDS:
Fog Computing, Key distribution, Hierarchical Networks.
1 INTRODUCTION
Fog computing can be broadly defined as extending the cloud to the edge of the network to enable processing data as close as possible to the
data origin (i.e., end devices) 1,2. Such an architecture reduces data processing delay and resource consumption, which are critical in time-sensitive
applications, in the era of Internet-of-Things 3. As defined by NIST 4, fog devices (also known as fog nodes) can be any device with computing and
storage capabilities, deployed in a variety of environments within the end devices access network, placed between millions of end device and the
cloud. Some examples of fog nodes are cellular base stations, access points, roadside units, embedded servers, and even smartphones 5,6,7.
Fog computing is increasingly prevalent, such as in oil and gas, and smart transport sectors 8. This is partly perhaps due to thehuge amount of data
generated every day via smart nodes. For example, an offshore oil rig generates 2TBof data everymonth, and processing these data closer to its ori-
ginwould provide significant performance benefits 8.Moreover, there are several time-sensitive applications that require real-timedata processing
and decision making. Decisions to be made by smart nodes are unlikely to be complex, and hence many data analysis tasks in the smart networks
can be performed in the fog layer where more powerful and resourceful nodes reside. This will reduce latency and communication overhead. For
example, consider a scenario in which oil pipeline sensors capture an unusual pressure change. In such a scenario, processing of the generated data
in the fog layer and making an appropriate decision would be more efficient and time-saving, compared to when the data is sent to the cloud for
processing. One of the basic andmost wildly used architectures in the fog computing is hierarchical three-layer architecture 9,10. Figure 1 depicts
an example fog computing architecture, where end devices, fog nodes, and cloud services form a three-layer hierarchical network structure 4,11,3.
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The up-most layer is termed as Cloud layer which consists of cloud and data storage servers. We assume this layer to be a resourceful network
component with high communicative and processing capabilities, managed by the Cloud Service Providers (CSP). The middle layer termed as fog
layer, which consists of network devices, such as routers, switches, and access points that serve as a gateway to the Internet. Finally the lowest layer
also known as end devices layer consists of resource-constrained sensor nodes and IoT devices.
In such a network model, end nodes, fog nodes, and cloud layer have different capabilities, in terms of processing power, communication range,
and power consumption. One particular challenge in fog computing is secure communication between these three layers; specifically
1. Communication between fog nodes and Cloud service center;
2. Communication among fog nodes;
3. Communication among constraint-IoT enabled end devices;
4. Communication between fog nodes and end devices.
Therefore, there is a need for efficient authentication, encryption, and key management protocols to ensure secure communication in fog
networks 12.
Cloud layer 
Fog layer | Cluster Heads
End-device layer | Cluster nodes
Cluster Head (CH)
Cluster Node (CN)
CN-to-CN  Link
CN-to-CH  Link
TCP-IP Link
Base Station
Fog nodes  Link
FIGURE 1 An example fog computing architecture.
A Fog network comprises devices with relatively limited computing resources, hence, it is typically not realistic to execute conventional security
solutions on Fog network 12. The challenge of establishing secure communication between end devices, and between end devices and fog nodes, is
similar to that of establishing secure communication problem in a HierarchicalWireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). The latter is a relatively mature
andwell understood area, where a number of symmetric key encryption schemes have been proposed in the literature 13,14,15.
In addition to a secure key establishment, there is a need to ensure that other requirements (e.g., network connectivity and scalability) can be
achieved. There is a fairly rich literature in the context of key management/distribution schemes inWSNs 16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26. However, most
proposed schemes impose high computational, communication, and memory overhead. A number of key distribution schemes for flat networks
based on combinatorial design, a scalablemethod that distributes key between all nodes deterministically in order to increase the network connec-
tivity and reduce memory consumption, have also been proposed in the literature 16,18,21,25,26. Such schemes are, however, not directly applicable
to hierarchical fog networks. Therefore, there is a need for an effective “hierarchical key management and key distribution” schemes designed for
fog networks, given its increasing popularity. In this paper, we present a hierarchical key pre-distribution scheme based on "residual design", which
is a specific type of combinatorial design, for fog networks. The proposed scheme allows distribution of keys to the network devices/nodes prior
to network deployment. The residual design would significantly reduce memory consumption on end devices. Moreover, the residual design of the
key pre-distribution improves the network scalability, allowing to support large networks with almost similar amount of memory requirement. In
our proposed method, we focus on the communications within the lower two layers of the fog computing architecture (refer to Figure 1 ), i.e., end
device layer and fog layer. In particular, we consider the communication between end devices, and between fog nodes and end devices, due to the
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resource limitation of the end devices. We consider these two layers, i.e., fog and end device layers, as a hierarchical network in which the end
devices play the Cluster Node (CN) role and fog nodes play the Cluster Head (CH) role as we explain in Section 3.
In Section 2, we start by reviewing relevant literature, followed by a brief review of background materials on combinatorial designs and specifi-
cally residual design. In Section 3, we describe our system and attack model. Section 4 presents our proposed hierarchical key distribution scheme.
In Section 5, we then conduct both analytical and experimental evaluations, as well as a comparative study with other state-of-the-art hierarchical
key distribution schemes, considering different evaluation metrics, i.e., storage overhead, network scalability, connectivity and resilience against
node capture attacks. We show that our proposed scheme improves network scalability and reduce storage overhead compared to the previous
work, while providing a reasonable key share probability between end nodes. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and future research directions
are also described.
2 RELATEDWORKANDBACKGROUND
In fog Networks, security and privacy is a challenging issue in all three layers (refer to Figure 1 ) including cloud layer, fog layer and end devices
9. There are numerous surveys and research papers about security in the context of cloud computing. For example, in 27 researchers proposed a
traditional PKI based authenticationmechanism. Yu et al. 28 propose a data access control scheme based on attribute-based encryption (ABE). ABE
is a one-to-manypublic key encryptionmechanism that employs users identity as an attribute. InABE, a set of attributes and a private key computed
from the attributes are respectively used for encryption and decryption. Moreover, authors in 29,30,27 studied password-based authentication for
secure communications in cloud computing network.However, due to special requirements of fog networks, i.e., mobility, heterogeneity, large-scale
geo-distribution, and existence of resource constrained devices, utilization of security and privacymechanisms that are proposed for cloud are not
completely applicable to fog networks 31. Moreover, utilizing one common password for all the devices is not suitable for securing communication
between variety of devices in fog networks.
In order to address security and privacy challenges in fog computing, while considering the afore-mentioned features of fog networks, several
researchers focused on establishing a reliable communication between cloud and fog nodes. Alrawais et al 32 developed an encrypted key exchange
protocol based on Ciphertext-Policy Attribute Based Encryption (CP-ABE) to enable authentication and confidential communications between fog
nodes and cloud. In 33 a policy-based resource access control in fog networks based on public key based solutions is proposed to support secure
collaboration and interoperability between heterogeneous nodes. While the above-mentioned algorithms could be considered for securing the
communication between the fog nodes and cloud, they are usually resource-consuming and are not suitable for utilization in the end device layer of
the fog architecture.
The lowest layer of the fog architecture, i.e., end devices, is composed of variety of devices including sensors. Security and privacy issues in the
context of wireless sensor networks is well-studied in the literature. As our concentration in this work is on the lowest layer of fog architecture,
we review the most related work to our proposal in Section 2.1. Due to the resource constraint inherent of end devices in the lowest layer of
the architecture, many researchers concentrated on proposing secure, lightweight and energy efficient approaches, which we discuss in the next
section. Themain challenges of the existing solutions are scalability andmemory overhead, which was ourmotivation for the current work.
2.1 Existing Schemes for End devices layer
Symmetric key schemes
In symmetric key schemes, the key sharing procedure could be performed either before the network deployment (so-called key pre-distribution)
or after the network deployment. Generally, a key distribution center (KDC) performs the key generation and distribution process. Due to the
constrained energy budget and limited computational and communication capacities of end devices, key pre-distribution schemes (KPSs) are the
most desirable options. Hence, our concentration here is on the KPSs, in which keys are loaded into end devices’ memory before their distribu-
tion in the network. In such schemes, usually every pair of nodes are able to securely communicate with each other due to their shared common
credential(s) 13,14,15. The pre-shared credentials might be produced randomly or deterministically.
Random key pre-distribution:
In these approaches, credentials (keyswhich are bytes) are chosen randomly fromakeypool anddistributed amongnodes. Eschenauer andGligor 17
were the first to propose a random key pre-distribution scheme specifically for WSNs. This scheme is simple and has low memory usage while
ensuring network connectivity. However, it fails to provide pair-wise authentication and requires significant communication overhead 13. Several
solutions based on 17 were subsequently proposed 34,35,36,37. These latter schemes modified the random key pre-distribution scheme by increasing
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connectivity between nodes or decreasing storage overhead of sensor nodes. However, they are proposed for flat networks and are not effective
for hierarchical heterogeneous fog scenarios.
Deterministic key distribution:
In deterministic key distribution schemes, the key pool is generated using a deterministic process. In several existing deterministic models, math-
ematical designs have been applied in key generation and distribution. The Combinatorial design is one known mathematical scheme used in this
category 25. In 16, the authors proposed two key pre-distribution schemes based on Symmetric Balanced Incomplete BlockDesign (SBIBD) andGen-
eralized Quadrangles (GQ) 26. However, both schemes are not scalable and are vulnerable to node capture attacks. In 25, the authors adopted the
concept of set system in deterministic KPS and applied Transversal Design (TD), and proved the scheme to be more secure than that in 17 against
node capture attacks 38. Trade-KP is another scheme based on paired balanced incomplete block design 18. Similarly, orthogonal arrays are used
in 19. Asmost of the explained keymanagement schemes 17,18,19,25,26,38 are proposed for homogeneous orflat networks, they cannot be deployed for
hierarchical heterogeneous fog scenarios. Recently, several KPSs for heterogeneous networks have been proposed in the literature. For example,
the scheme in 21 is based on TD and has been shown to be more resilient against node compromise attack in comparison with TD 25 and BIBD
schemes.
Asymmetric key schemes
Asymmetric or public key cryptography schemes are conventionally used to establish secure communication between entities. Such schemes are
not suitable for deployment on low power battery operated devices, due to the need to compute expensive cryptographic operation(s), although
there have also been attempts to design asymmetric key schemes for resource-constrained environments, such as IoT. For example, the proposed
approaches in 39 and 40 seek to minimize the number of exchangedmessages. Rabin’s scheme 39 is similar to the RSA algorithm and has high energy
consumption for decryption operations, although it is faster than RSA. NtruEncrypt 40 is more efficient and suitable for some resource-limited
devices as the schemeconsumes less energy.However, it generates large-sizemessages leading to communication overheaddue to the requirement
for re-transmission in noisy environments. Liu et. al. 41introduced two secure traffic light control schemes in Vehicular Ad hoc NETwork (VANET)
using fog computing based on the hardness of the computational Deffie-Helman puzzle. Although they propose an improved scheme, in which a
traffic light in fog layer needs to perform lightweight operations, but it does not consider communication and computation overhead imposed to the
lowest layer devices. Other researchers 42,43,44,45,46 argue that asymmetric solutions are actually suitable for resource-constrained devices due to
theirflexibility and scalability in terms of shared keymanagement. However, most of these schemes havemore or less similar challengesmentioned
earlier, and are not fully applicable for our fog scenario.
Also, most asymmetric-based schemes in the literature focus on flat networks with homogeneous sensors. Recently, there have been published
schemes for hierarchical networks based on asymmetric key distribution. For example, in 47 and 48, two key generation and distribution schemes
based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) for hierarchicalWSNs are presented.
Discussion
Having explained the existig methods for providing secure communication in fog networks, we can conclude that schemes that use asymetric
encryption usually mandate expensive computation and communication cost on nodes. However, these approaches are more scalable and resilient
against node capture attacks with less memory requirements. On the other hand, symmetric key encryption has less computational complex-
ity,which is an important feature dues to resource-constraint nature of end devices. However, existing symmetric key pre-distribution schemes
suffer from low connectivity, high communication complexity, high memory overhead, and limited scalability, and are vulnerable against node
capture attacks 49. These challenges motivated us to devise a new symmetric key pre-distribution scheme to address the scalability and mem-
ory challenges, while taking into account resilience against node capture attack. Our proposal provides a reasonable key sharing probability and
significantly reduced thememory requirements.
2.2 Combinatorial Design
Since our proposedmethod is based on amathematical structure, named combinatorial design, in this section we provide the required background
which is necessary to follow the rest of the paper.
Definition 1. A set design is a pair (X,A)whereX is a set of v elements (points) andA is a finite set of subsets ofX called blocks. The degree of a
point x ∈ X is the number of blocks containing x. The rank of a set system is the size of the largest block and (X,A) is said to be uniform of rank k if
all blocks have the same size k 25.
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Definition 2. Balanced Incomplete Block Design (BIBD) is a set design. It is an arrangement of v distinct objects into b blocks, where each block
contains exactlykdistinct objects, eachobject occurs in exactly r different blocks, andevery twodistinct objects occur together in exactly blocks" 50.
It is denoted either by (v, k, λ) or (v, b, r, k, λ)where λ× (v − 1) = r × (k− 1) and b× k = v × r.
Definition 3. Symmetric BIBD (SBIBD) is a BIBD for which b = v and, consequently, r = k. It is denoted by (v, k, ) − SBIBD. For every prime
q ≥ 2 there exists a symmetric (q2 + q+ 1, q+ 1, 1)-BIBD known as projective plane 51.
Definition 4. For every prime power q ≥ 2, there exists a (q2 + q+ 1, q+ 1, 1)-SBIBD (i.e., a projective plane of order q) 51.
Definition 5.ALatin square on q symbols is a q×q array such that each of the q symbols occurs exactly once in each row and in each column. The
number q is called order of square. IfA = (aij) andB = (bij) are any two q × q arrays, the join ofA andB is a q × q array whose (i, j) − th element
is the pair (aij, bij). Latin squares A and B of order q are orthogonal if all entries of A join B are distinct. Latin square A1,A2, ...,Ar are Mutually
Orthogonal Latin Squares (MOLS) if they are orthogonal in pairs. For prime power q, a set of (q−1)MOLS of order q can be used to construct affine
plane of order q, and can be converted to a projective plane of order q 51.
Definition6. According to Definition 2, any two blocks of an SBIBD contain λ common points. The relation between affine and projective plains
can be generalized to other block designs. This result provides another method of constructing newBIBDs called Residual Design.
Residual Design Theorem: Suppose (X,A) be a symmetric (v, k, λ)-BIBDwhereA = {A1,A2, ...,Av} andX = {x1, , xv}. Let for every 1 ≤ i ≤ v,
Ai ∈ A. Then, {A1 \ Ai,A2 \ Ai, ...,Ai−1 \ Ai,Ai+1 \ Ai, ...,Av \ Ai} are blocks of a (v − k, v − 1, k, k − λ, λ)-BIBD from set point X \ Ai. Thus,
Res(X,A,A0) = {X \ A0, {A \ A0 : A 6= A0}} is residual design of BIBD based onA0 25. Residual design is constructed by deleting all points in A0
and then deletingA0. Clearly, a residual design is a BIBD, having block size at least two and at most the number of points minus one.
Example1: Suppose (7,3,1)-BIBD with the following point set and blocks: V = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} B1 = {1, 2, 3}, B2 = {1, 4, 5}, B3 = {1, 6, 7},
B4 = {2, 4, 6}, B5 = {2, 5, 7}, B6 = {3, 4, 7}, B7 = {3, 5, 6}. Then, we have seven classes to build the residual sets, each forming a (4,6,1)-BIBD,
which we explain in the following.
1. C1 = X \ B1 = {4, 5, 6, 7},B2 \ B1 = {4, 5},B3 \ B1 = {6, 7},B4 \ B1 = {4, 6},B5 \ B1 = {5, 7},B6 \ B1 = {4, 7},B7 \ B1 = {5, 6}.
2. C2 = X \ B2 = {2, 3, 6, 7},B1 \ B2 = {2, 3},B3 \ B2 = {6, 7},B4 \ B2 = {2, 6},B5 \ B2 = {2, 7},B6 \ B2 = {3, 7},B7 \ B2 = {3, 6}.
3. C3 = X \ B3 = {2, 3, 4, 5},B1 \ B3 = {2, 3},B2 \ B3 = {4, 5},B4 \ B3 = {2, 4},B5 \ B3 = {2, 5},B6 \ B3 = {3, 4},B7 \ B3 = {3, 5}.
4. C4 = X \ B4 = {1, 3, 5, 7},B1 \ B4 = {1, 3},B2 \ B4 = {1, 5},B3 \ B4 = {1, 7},B5 \ B4 = {5, 7},B6 \ B4 = {3, 7},B7 \ B4 = {3, 5}.
5. C5 = X \ B5 = {1, 3, 4, 6},B1 \ B5 = {1, 3},B2 \ B5 = {1, 4},B3 \ B5 = {1, 6},B4 \ B5 = {4, 6},B6 \ B5 = {3, 4},B7 \ B5 = {3, 6}.
6. C6 = X \ B6 = {1, 2, 5, 6},B1 \ B6 = {1, 2},B2 \ B6 = {1, 5},B3 \ B6 = {1, 6},B4 \ B6 = {2, 6},B5 \ B6 = {2, 5},B7 \ B6 = {5, 6}.
7. C7 = X \ B7 = {1, 2, 4, 7},B1 \ B7 = {1, 2},B2 \ B7 = {1, 4},B3 \ B7 = {1, 7},B4 \ B7 = {2, 4},B5 \ B7 = {2, 7},B6 \ B7 = {4, 7}.
Most of the key distribution schemeswhich use combinatorial design to produce their key rings provide full or high connectivity between pair of
nodes in the network. However, an important point to consider is that, higher connectivity leads to lower resilience 25.
On the other hand, themain problem of existing KPSs that use combinatorial methods 17,52,18 is their limited scalability. Therefore, we show that
the basicmapping from residual design toKPSs, that is proposed in 53, and its usage for hierarchical network architecture provides higher scalability,
good connectivity and higher resilience against node capture attack.
3 SYSTEMMODEL
In our network mode, we consider a hierarchical fog network as shown in Figure (2 ). In the lowest layer, we consider end devices as cluster nodes
(CNs), which are resource-constrained devices capable of communicating with each other directly or via multi-hop path, as well as with the fog
nodes in the higher layer. In the physical fog layer, we consider two virtual layers (similar to 54): 1) several fog nodes, such as smart phones, access
points, orworkstations, serving as cluster heads (CHs) at the upper sub-layer of the fog layer, which havemore capabilities and resources compared
to the end devices. These fog nodes are directly connected to end devices and are able to receive and process data for CNs. Fog nodes in sub-
layer-1 are connected to a higher sub-layer, which we consider as Base Stations (BSs), through the internet backbone. We consider the BS to be a
resourceful component having high communicative and processing capabilities and memory capacity, which acts as a gateway to the Internet, as
well as providing human interface. Base stations are connected to the top layer, cloud servers, via TCP/IP connection. If the workloads received by
sub-layer-1 fog nodes (CHs) exceed their computational capacity, the excessive amount of data will be forwarded to the higher sub-layer or BS. If
needed BS will forward workload to the cloud through internet backbone. We can consider the end devices that are in a specific area, e.g., in an
apartment, as a cluster. However, in case there are a large number of independent nodes in a cluster, we might have several clusters inside an area.
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All of nodes in these clusters carry sensitive data, and hence the exchanged data should be encrypted and delivered only to the authorized entities.
Therefore, the nodes inside one cluster require to have shared keys to communicatewith each other. However, in order to communicatewith other
clusters, the nodes inside a cluster need to send their messages through their corresponding CH in the fog layer. The BS serves as an edge router
that connects given cluster to the Internet, to provide connectivity with other authorized devices or users. Table 1 presents the notations that are
used in the remaining of the paper.
CN CN CN
CH
CN CN CN
CH
CN CN CN
CH
BS BSBS
Cloud
End 
Devices
Fog 
devices
Sub-Layer-1
Servers
Sub-Layer-2
Servers
Data 
Centers
FIGURE 2 A schematic example of our considered system model. In this model, the lowest layer, is named "End Devices" layer that composed of
cluster nodes (depicted as CN) which are basically sensor nodes, IoT devices and so on. The middle layer, is named "Fog" layer which consists of
tow sub-layer: 1. Cluster Heads (depicted as CH) which are basically access points, routers and so on; 2. Base Station (depicted as BS) as the upper
sub-layer. The topmost layer, is named "Cloud" layer.
TABLE 1 List of UsedNotations.
Notation Definition
N The network size
NRD Number of supported nodes in Residual Design KPS
BS Base Station
C Total number of clusters
nj Number of nodes in cluster j
CNji i-th cluster node of cluster head j
CN Cluster Node
CH Cluster Head
CHi(Ci) i-th class of residual design
KBS − CHj Pair-wise key between base station and cluster head
q A prime number which satisfies certain conditions.
In our scheme, we consider to haveNRD nodes, composed of (q2 + q+ 1) fog nodes (CHs), where q is a prime number, q ≥ 2; as well as (q2 + q+
1) × (q2 + q) low end devices (CNs), where q ≥ 3. Our proposed network model requires three phases of deployment: (i) Pre-deployment phase:
using a safe BS or a KDC we construct a key pool from which q2 + q + 1 blocks are generated using a SBIBD scheme. Then, the obtained residual
design blocks are used to generate (q2 + q + 1)2 blocks from which (q2 + q + 1) blocks are assigned to CHs and (q2 + q + 1) × (q2 + q) blocks
are assigned to CNs; (ii) Shared-key discovery and path key establishment phase: node deployment and clustering is performed in this phase. Nodes
PoonehNikkhah Bahrami ET AL 7
TABLE 2 Mapping FromResidual Design to KeyDistribution.
Residual Design Key pre-distribution
Point set(|S|) Key pool (KP)
Object Set size (|S| = q2 + q+ 1) key pool size
Blocks Key ring
Number of Blocks ((q2 + q+ 1)(q2 + q)) Number of key rings
Size of a block (k = q) Size of a key ring
which are in each others’ transmission range exchange a list of key identifiers to find a shared key; neighbouring nodes with no shared key rely on a
mediator node to discover a path key. (iii) Post deployment authentication: after network deployment and cluster configuration, users whowant to
reach data inside a cluster need to authenticate to the BS and CHs.
3.1 AttackModel
In this work, our main concentration is on secure intra-cluster and inter-cluster communication. Since not all services provided by a cluster are
public, an authentication and authorization mechanism must be developed to protect against unauthorized user. We assume that the BS is secure
and is in charge of performing the authentication and expensive tasks. The authentication process relies on the BS as a gateway between edge
devices 55, 56. Before the network deployment, BS acts as a KDC and generates keys (based on our proposed scheme that we explain in Section 4) to
be assigned to the nodes in its corresponding cluster. In other words, each end device is pre-loaded with required secret keys for message encryp-
tion. The key pre-distribution algorithm in its pre-deployment phase is assumed to be secure since keys are loaded offline in the nodes prior to their
deployment in the network. Thus, an attacker does not have access to key pool and key chains of nodes. Moreover, consistent with the literature 57,
the bootstrapping time for a node, is shorter than the time required for an attacker to comprise a node. Hence, a node can not be compromised
during this time. Communication is assumed to be secure in the shared-key discovery phase 17 since the nodes only exchange key identifiers in this
phase and an attacker who does not know themapping between identifiers and the keys cannot recognize the shared key(s) between two nodes by
eavesdropping, without a physical access to the node. An attacker node can replace itself as a real node only when it captures a node physically and
seizes its keys 58.
We also assume that every Internet user before using the data services provided by the end devices in clusters, should be registered to BS and
demanded CH(s) to obtain its access authorization. This phase includes the verification of the user’s password, e.g., by smart card 59. It should be
mentioned that authentication process for Internet users is independent of the authentication process of domestic nodes.
The nature of restricted end devices makes them more vulnerable against security attacks, such as node capture attack. Physical capture is a
common threat that endangers inter-node links through manipulating security keys. It is considered by many as the pioneer attack that paves the
way for other attack types 50. Thus, the present study considers and enhances the network resilience against node capture attacks.
4 THE PROPOSEDAPPROACH
In this section we discuss our proposed user authentication and key agreement scheme for edge network. Our main concentration is on key agree-
ment between edge devices and also communication between devices and the fog nodes. The basic idea of the proposed key management scheme
is utilisation of residual theorem by the KDC (the BS) to build key-chain in off-line pre-deployment phase. Clustering is based on a node that was
used in subtraction phase of the residual design. Prior to their deployment in a target field (deployment field), nodes (end devices and fog nodes)
are loaded with key chains built by the KDC (or BS) based on res(X,A,Ai). In what follows we explain our proposed key generation phase based on
residual theorem, and its mapping to fog network (see Table 2 ).
Pre-deployment phase: A residual design is used to generate initial keys. Finite projective planes of orderq (a type of SBIBDwith (q2+q+1, q2+
1, 1) parameter) are used for constructing residual designs, provided that (q2 + q + 1)2 ≥ NRD. Let us assume that i-th class of residual design is
generated by using point setX \ Ai denoted byCi, and j-th node from classCi withAj \ Ai is denoted byAij (j = 1, ..., v; i = 1, ..., i− 1, i+ 1, ..., v).
Since in this design, key rings are loaded before node deployment, classes should be predetermined. Consider two following properties:
1. The point sets of each class of the proposed scheme formed a BIBD with (v, b, r, k, λ) = (q2, q2 + q, q + 1, q, 1) parameters.
Proof: This property results from residual theorem in Section 2.2.
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2. Suppose that key ring and key space sizes in symmetric key distribution design are k = q + 1 and v = q2 +
q + 1, respectively. Then, residual design supports a network with maximum size of NRD = (q2 + q + 1)2.
Proof: Since every class of residual design forms a (q2, q2+q, q+1, q, 1)-BIBD, and the number of classes equals to q2+q+1, the proposed
scheme supports up to (q2 + q+ 1)× (q2 + q) nodes. Each block of the classCi can be assigned to CH nodes.
Therefore, a total number of (q2 + q + 1) × (q2 + q) + (q2 + q + 1) = (q2 + q + 1)2 nodes are covered. The nodes (end devices) are deployed
randomly in a cluster, and each CH is deployed in that cluster around the center of that cluster. The BS is located in the fog layer of the network.
Shared key discovery: After deployment of cluster nodes in their relative clusters, every node of each cluster has to identify other CNs within
its communication range with which it has a shared key. To do so each two nodes exchange their own key identifiers on their key ring through a
network broadcasting 17. The motivation of this phase is to establish a routing graph of the end devices. Existence of a link between two CNs has
three meanings: i) they belong to the same cluster; ii) they are placed in their communication range, and finally iii) they have a common key to
communicate safe on that link by encryption.
After node deployment, CHs generate a random unique number and then transmit the encrypted number to their cluster members via a shared
key. The random number is added to the end of the keys of the cluster head as well as the related cluster node. It is worth mentioning that the
random number does not have any role in communications between CNs and CHs directly; it is just used to separate the key space of each cluster
head into its unique spaces. Hence, revealing random number alone does not cause any sensible risk to secure communications of the network. A
communication will be in risk when both random number and key chainKij are revealed by the adversary due to a node capture attack.
In our scheme, we use BIBD for key pre-distribution in CHs. Every pair of CHs share a key at some point because BIBD is a fully-connected KPS
where a pair of nodes can directly connect to each other. Because number of CHs is limited, BIBD is the best choice for establishing connections
between CHs. As explained, clusters are assigned different key spaces. This will reduce node capture attack effects. On the other hand, residual
design enhances network scalability since a large number of blocks can be generated with a parameter q.
Registration, login and authentication phase: After deployment of end devices and fog nodes and completion of shared key discovery process
and path key establishment, the remote user authentication phase starts. Since our main goal in this paper is to establish a secure communication
between CNs,between CNs and its related CH in a cluster and also between CHs, we assume that when the remote user Ui wants to access data
from the intended cluster, he/she can perform it using some existing secure techniques 60. Based on proposed schemes the user Ui needs to be
authenticated at both the BS and the demanded CHs within the cluster(s) that he/she wants to access data. After successful authentication, the
user and authenticated CH(s) will be able to establish a secure communication link using a shared secret session key. In fact, this session key is the
means of approaching user to data inside cluster via its CH.
5 ANALYSISOF THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, the proposed scheme is analysed considering four important metrics: memory overhead, scalability, network connectivity and its
resilience against node capture attacks.
5.1 Simulation Setting
In our simulation experiment, we consider a network of nodes that are distributed uniformly in a 1 × 1 square. Sensor coordinates are denoted by
(x,y) where x and y are randomuniformdigits between 0 and 1. Radio range of a node is a circle of radius r, where 0 < r < 1. A graph can be obtained
by connecting each node to the neighboring sensor in the same radio range. The node degree can substitute for location and communicating range
r. The relationship between average node degree d and communication range r, as suggested in 61, is calculated as
d = (n− 1)(pir2 − 8/3r3 + 1/2r4) (1)
To evaluate our scheme security, we need to determine the number of sensor nodes and nodes mean degree to create a random graph with similar
properties.
The average degree of the random graph vertices is calculated by (2) to build a graphwith probability of c 17:
d = ((n− 1)/n)× (ln(n)− ln(n)(− ln(c)))) (2)
Where c=0.9 or 0.99 or 0.999. This means the network will âA˘IJalmost certainlyâA˘I˙ be connected. In the present study, to simulate combinato-
rial designs in fog networks, key chains are built using residual design and then attributed to nodes. Moreover, a connected random graph with
probability of 0.9 is used to establish security and key sharing between nodes and simulation is performed using C].NET
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5.2 Performance Evaluation
Considering thatmostly the nodes in the end device layer (and possibly some nodes in fog layer) are resource constraint, we have similar limitations
as HWSN in our fog scenario. As, to the best of our knowledge, there is not a hierarchical key distribution method dedicated to fog networks in the
literature, we compare our proposed scheme with related work in HWSN.We compare our proposal with the state-of-the-art solutions presented
in 21, 47 and 48. In 21 a symmetric KPS for hierarchical WSNs based on TD is proposed, while, 47 adopts public key cryptography to establish secure
communications in hierarchicalWSNs. Finally, in 48 authors presented three keymanagement schemes, namely SACK, SACK-P, and SACK-H, which
are using symmetric, asymmetric and hybrid cryptographic algorithms, respectively. It is worthmentioning that, in 47 authors compared theirmodel
with 23 and 62 in term of resiliency against node capture attacks, memory overhead and scalability, and proved that their proposal outperforms the
previous solutions; hence, we avoid providing a comparative analysis between our proposedmethod and the schemes in 23 and 62. We consider the
following definition for each of the consideredmetrics: Connectivity: probability of any given pair of neighbouring nodes sharing at least a common
key. If twonodes are neighbours, it is called local connectivity; otherwise, it stands for global connectivity. Network Scalability: the ability to support
different network sizes and add new nodes in the network, while having the same key pool and same key-chain length 63. In this section, in order
to evaluate the scalability of different schemes, we compute the number of keys required by each scheme to support the same network size. The
smaller the required number of keys, the more scalable is the scheme. Memory overhead: the amount of memory required to store key-chain. The
key-chain size is related to the number of keys in the key-chain of a node 26.
5.2.1 Memory overhead
Number of keys in each node:
As we discussed earlier every CN is preloaded with a distinct q-key chain which is a block of a residual design. As shown in Table 2 , the number
of CHs and CNs is C and N, respectively. Number of cluster nodes in each cluster is denoted by nj. According to mapping in Table 2 , by using
(q2 + q + 1, q + 1, 1) -SBIBD and residual design we can generate q2 + q + 1 clusters each of them is a (q2, q2 + q, q + 1, q, 1)-BIBD so N =
(q2+q+1)(q2+q),C = q2+q+1. In keypre-distribution schemebasedon residual design, eachCH is preloadedwith akey chainof length (q2+q) to
communicatewith its ownCNs and is also loadedwith a key chain of BIBDdesignwith length of√(q2 + q+ 1) to establish secure communications
with other CHs. Key pre-distribution in hierarchical networks is privileged in comparison to public key cryptography protocols 64. To show this
advantage, the proposed scheme is compared in terms of number of required keis in each node and memory usage with 47 and 48 that use elliptic
curve cryptography (ECC) for generation and distribution. In 47, public key cryptography algorithm is used for establishing a secure connection in
hierarchical networks, and in 48 auniformsecurity framework is suggested, including threekeymanagement schemesof SACKC, SACK-P, andSACK-
H, from which only SACK-P uses public key cryptography. Therefore, only SACK-P is compared with our proposed scheme. In 21 a hierarchical key
pre-distribution scheme that use combinatorial design based on TD is used. we show that in compare with aforementionedmethods the number of
required key in each node of our scheme is considerably less which reducesmemory overhead of CNs. The number of required keys in each scheme
having the same network size is given in Table 3 . As it is comparable, the proposed scheme requires fewer keys specifically in CNs at equal network
size. Numerical results of required keys in each node to achieve 90.000 nodes (include CHs and CNs) in a hierarchical wireless sensor is given in
figure (3 ).
TABLE 3 NumberOf Required Keys In Each Node
Scheme Number of keys in each CH Number of keys in each CN
Proposed
Scheme
nj + (
√
(q2 + q+ 1)) = (q2 + q) +
(
√
(q2 + q+ 1))
q
Scheme in 21 √N + √C = √(q2 + q+ 1)(q2 + 1) +√
(q2 + q+ 1)
C = q2 + q+ 1
Scheme in 47 N+ 2 = (q2 + q+ 1)(q2 + q) + 2 (C+ 2) + dm=(q2 + q+ 3) + 7
Scheme in 48 nj + C+ 1=(q2 + q) + (q2 + q+ 1) + 1 nj + 2 = (q2 + q) + 2
Memory usage
Thememory storage requirement for loading each singleCH is ((q2+q)+√(q2 + q+ 1))×SK, whereSk is the key size in symmetric cryptography.
Moreover, length of key chain for every CN in residual design is q. Therefore, memory storage requirement for CN is q × SK. In order to do the
comparison, networks size should suppose equal.Moreoverwe suppose the number of CNs in eachCH is equal. Let network size to be (q2+q+1)2,
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FIGURE 3 Number of required keys in each scheme at equal network size (90.000 sensor nodes)
i.e. (q2+q+1) clusters, where each cluster has (q2+q) nodes and oneCH.AK is the key size in public key cryptography, then,memory requirement
for 47, 48 and 21 is given in Table (4 ) Here, dm denotes maximum degree of neighborhood in 47 which is according to 47 equals to 7. Now, we use a
numerical example to compare memory usage of the proposed scheme, 48, 21 and 47. Let N=930 be number of CNs and C=31 be number of CHs in
a hierarchical wireless sensor network. A (25,30,6,5,1)-BIBD design is used for each cluster. Also, ECC(163-bit) and RC5(80-bit) are respectively
used for asymmetric and symmetric encryption. Table 5 demonstrates memory requirement for each CN and CH. Acquired values confirm that
our proposed scheme reduces the memory usage in sensor nodes by ≈ 84%; the scheme in 48 needs memory storage 13 and 35 times more than
our scheme for each CH and CN, respectively, and memory storage requirement for each CN and CH in 47 is about 15 and 52 times of our scheme.
Though thememory consumption of CHs in the scheme that is proposed in 21 is close to our proposedmethod, but asCHs are placed in the fog layer
and hasmore resources compared to the end devices, thememory usage in CHs is less important than CNs. Instead, thememory usage in CNs in 21
is around six times more than our proposed scheme that depicts our scheme outperforms the scheme in 21 for resource constrained end devices.
Therefore, we can conclude that our proposed schemehas better performance compared to three other schemes in terms ofmemory consumption;
it supports larger number of nodes in the network, while requiring less number of keys.
TABLE 4 Comparison of the RequiredMemory Storage
Scheme Number of keys in each CH Number of keys in each CN
Proposed
scheme
((q2 + q) + (
√
(q2 + q+ 1)))× Sl Sk × q
Scheme in 21 (√(q2 + q+ 1)(q2 + 1) +√
(q2 + q+ 1))× Sk
C = (q2 + q+ 1)× Sk
Scheme in 47 ((q2 + q+ 1)(q2 + q) + 2)× Ak (C+ 2)+ dm=((q2 + q+ 3)×Ak)+
(dm × Sk)
Scheme in 48 ((q2 + q) + (q2 + q+ 1) + 1)× Ak ((q2 + q) + 2)× Ak
TABLE 5 Comparison of the RequiredMemory Storage (in bit)
Scheme RequiredMemory by each CH RequiredMemory by each CN
Proposed
scheme
(30+
√
31)× 80 = 2880 50× 80 = 400
Scheme in 21 (√930+√30)× 80 = 2960 31× 80 = 2480
Scheme in 47 (930+ 2)× 160 = 149120 ((31+2)×160)+(7×160) = 5840
Scheme in 48 (30+ 31+ 1)× 160 = 99200 (30+ 2)× 160 = 5120
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5.2.2 Scalability
Network scalability can bemeasured by themaximumnumber of nodes that is supported in a scheme, given the same key pool and key chain length.
The number of generated key chains is equal to the maximum number of nodes that a design can support. As each cluster forms a (q2, q2 + q, q +
1, q, 1) − BIBD and the number of clusters equals to the size of points, i.e. C = V = q2 + q + 1, and each of the clusters contains q2 + q nodes, a
maximumnumber of (q2+q+1)(q2+q)+(q2+q+1) = (q2+q+1)2 nodes can be supported by the proposed scheme. For example, if a network
is composed of 2500 nodes, the smallest prime number thatmeets this requirement is q=7which generates 3192 key chains (plus 57 cluster heads,
totally 3249 nodes). Out of these generated key chains, 2500 key chains will be allocated to the sensor nodes and in the case of future network
expansion, a key ring of size 7 remains that could be used for other 692 nodes thatmight be added in the future. Table (6 ) shows that the proposed
scheme is more scalable compared to similar hierarchical schemes, such as 21, 48, and 47, as it supports larger network sizes requiring fewer number
of keys in sensor nodes (I.e., CN). The proposed scheme may support 1000.000 nodes with only 31 keys, while other three schemes require more
than 1000 keys for the same network size, which shows≈ 96% improvement. However, the number of required CHs keys in our scheme is about
one percentmore than the number of required keys in 21 (see Table (7 )). Analysis of this simple example shows thatmapping residual design to key
pre-distribution significantly improves the scalability of the scheme.
TABLE 6 Network Scalability-Comparison of required number of keys in CNs of different schemes to support Network with size N
scheme Network Size
1× 105 2× 105 4× 105 6× 105 8× 105 10× 105
ProposedScheme 17 21 25 27 29 31
Scheme in 21 316 447 632 775 894 1000
Scheme in 47 323 454 639 782 901 1007
Scheme in 48 317 448 633 776 895 1001
TABLE 7 Network scalability - comparison of required number of keys in CHs of different schemes to support Network with size N
scheme Network Size
1× 105 2× 105 4× 105 6× 105 8× 105 10× 105
ProposedScheme 333 467 657 801 923 1031
Scheme in 21 325 458 465 788 910 1016
Scheme in 47 99686 199555 399369 599227 799108 999002
Scheme in 48 632 894 1265 1549 1789 2000
5.2.3 Network Connectivity
Twoneighboringnodeswith at least one sharedkey candirectly communicatewith eachother. LetPr1be theprobability of existenceof a sharedkey
between a pair of nodes in the network. To calculate Pr1, at first the local connectivity for each cluster (Pr1j) should be computed as summarized in
3 and then connectivity of the entire network can be obtained by computing weighted average of all clusters as discussed in 4.When using residual
design for key pre-distribution, in each cluster, each key is contained q+ 1 key-chain from among q2 + q possible options (because each cluster is a
(q2, q2 + q, q+ 1, q, 1) -BIBD. Consider CNji and CNjz are randomly picked from cluster j, where CNji is preloaded with q keys and CNjz is preloaded
with another q distinct keys. Each keys in nodeCNji is contained in other q (q+1-1=q) key-chains from q2+ q− 1 existing keys. Asλ = 1, so each pair
of keys may share only one key-chain with each other. Therefore, key chains with two distinct keys from key ringCNji are completely disjoint which
means every node shares a keywith (r− 1)× k = q× q ((2.2)) nodes from q2 + q− 1 possible nodes. The probability of sharing a key in a cluster is
calculated as follows.
Pr1j =
(q × q)
(q2 + q − 1) (3)
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Aswementioned earlier nj is the total number of nodes in cluster j which equals to q2 + q. Total network connectivity is given by 4.
Pr1 =
C∑
i=1
nj × Pr1j
N
=
C∑
i=1
nj × Pr1j
(q2 + q+ 1)(q2 + q)
=
((q2 + q+ 1)(q2 + q)× (q2))
((q2 + q+ 1)(q2 + q)× (q2 + q− 1))
(4)
Finally the probability of sharing a common key can be calculated as:
pr1 =
q2
(q2 + q − 1) (5)
The evaluation of this solution shows clearly that the basic mapping from clustered residual design to key pre-distribution gives a high key sharing
probability and reaches O(1) which show that probability of communication within a single hop is close to 1 (see Figure (4 )). It is notable that
two nodes from two distinct clusters may communicate through their CHs as they share a common key with all their CNs. Moreover, CHs may
communicate with each using pre-distributed BIBD key.
FIGURE 4 Probability of local connectivity versus the size of the key-chain
5.3 Resilience Against Node Capture Attacks
This section examines resiliency of the proposed scheme against node capture attacks i.e. how secure is communication between benign nodes
when x(x ≤ (q2 + q + 1)2) nodes are pawned by malicious actors. As discussed earlier, key pools in each cluster are separated after distribution.
Therefore, a captured node in a cluster has no effects on other cluster members, reflecting sustainability of our scheme in node capture attacks.
For example, suppose two nodes, v and u of cluster j are not captured. If x node from cluster j is attacked and decrypted, the probability that the
adversary can decrypt the communication between u and v is calculated as follows. Based on definitions and symbols given in Table 8 , we seek to
solve P(L|Cx), i.e. what’s the probability that any links between two uncaptured nodes being decrypted in case x nodes are captured in the given
network. If key k is the point set of a cluster which is observed by q+1 node, the probability that a given link is securedwith key k can be defined as
TABLE 8 Notation and definitions of resilience
Notation Definition
Cx Event that x nodes (key-rings) are captured.
Dk Event that a block containing key k is com-promised.
lk Event that a given link is securedwith key k.
l Event that a given link is secured.
Lk Event that a link secured with key k is com-promised.
L Event that a link is compromised.
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P (lk|l) =
((q+1)
2
)((q2+q)(q2+q+1)
2
) (6)
Also, the probability that x captured nodes in cluster j include key k is equal to
P(Dk|Cx) = 1− theprobabilityofnothavingkey = 1−
((q2+q)(q2+q+1)−(q+1)
x
)((q2+q)(q2+q+1)
x
) (7)
The probability that a given link remains secure evenwhen key k is compromised and x nodes are captured can be calculated as:
P (Lk|Cx) = P (lk|l)P (Dk|Cx) (8)
Finally, in the residual design, the probability that a link is compromisedwhen an attacker captures x nodes can be calculated as:
P(L|Cx) =
(q2+q+1)∑
j=1
(q+1
2
)((q2+q+1)(q2+q)
2
) (1− ((q2+q+1)(q2+q)−(q+1)x )((q2+q+1)(q2+q)
x
) ) (9)
We compare resilience of the proposed scheme against node capture attacks with a hierarchical scheme uses similar approach (combinatorial
design) in key establishment, 21. Table 9 shows a comparison between probability of node capture for 21 and the proposed scheme in case s nodes
are captured with 960 and 17698 nodes in the Network. Compared to 21, with equal NetworkSize, the proposed scheme shows higher resistance
against node capture attacks. This indicates that the proposed scheme promotes network resistance to node capture without restricting network
connectivity.
TABLE 9 Comparison of resilience against node capture attack
Network size Number of Captured nodes
Scheme in 21 10 100 200 300
960 0.3781 0.9914 0.9999 1
17689 0.2577 0.8614 0.9880 0.9973
Proposed scheme 10 100 200 300
960 0.022 0.216 0.416 0.536
17689 0.013 0.038 0.076 0.124
6 CONCLUSIONANDFUTUREWORK
In this paper, we proposed a key pre-distribution scheme for hierarchical architecture of fog networks. Our proposed key pre-distribution scheme
facilitates secure communication between devices inside a fog cluster and between end devices and the fog nodes. We showed that our proposal
is more efficient and scalable compared to the state-of-the-art combinatorial-based solutions for hierarchical networks. We also showed that the
proposed scheme improves thememory overhead and network scalability significantly, compared to similar schemes in the literature.
Future research includes extending the proposed scheme to supportmobility, and considering different attack scenarios to increase the network
resilience. Another potential future research could be designing an efficient keymanagement scheme for the cluster heads.
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